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Abstract
Computable OLG growth models and \convergence models" dier in their assessment of the extent
to which demography inuences economic growth. In this paper, I show that computable OLG growth
models produce results similar to those of convergence models when more detailed demographic
information is used. To do so, I implement a general equilibrium overlapping generations model to
explain Taiwan's economic miracle during the period 1965-2005. I nd that Taiwan's demographic
transition accounts for 22% of per capita output growth, 16.4% of the investment rate, and 18.5% of
the savings rate for the period 1965-2005. Decomposing the demographic eect into its components, I
nd that fertility alone explains the impact of demographic changes in per capita output growth, while
both fertility and mortality explain investment and saving rates. Assuming a small-open economy, I
nd that investment rates increase with more rapid population growth, while saving rates follows the
dependence hypothesis (Coale and Hoover, 1958). Under a closed-economy, the population growth
rate has a negative inuence on economic growth.
JEL Classication Numbers: E21; J1; O11
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11 Introduction
In the second half of the 20th century, the world experienced income growth rates never seen before,
as well as an accelerated decline in mortality and fertility (Lee, 2003). East-Asia beneted from these
two processes more than any other region in the world (Mason, 2001). Indeed, the East Asian nations
were the rst countries after World War II to make a rapid demographic transition from high mortality
and high fertility to low mortality and low fertility (Feeney and Mason, 2001). During the same period,
nine of these economies were among the countries with the highest per capita GDP growth (Barro and
Sala-i-Mart n, 2004). As a result of the simultaneity between economic and demographic processes in the
East Asian nations and elsewhere, studies that seek to explain the inuence of demography on economic
growth have attracted considerable attention.
An inuential article by Coale and Hoover (1958) shaped the rst contemporary models. They posited
that economies with a high total dependency ratio should present low or negative saving rates; and that,
conversely, an economy with a low total dependency ratio should have high saving rates. However, the
empirical results of studies testing the negative relationship between saving rates and the dependency
ratio have been mixed. Some analyses have conrmed the dependency hypothesis (Le, 1969; Modigliani,
1970; Fry and Mason, 1982; Mason, 1988; Higgins and Williamson, 1997), while others, using similar and
dierent econometric techniques, have not provided conclusive results (Goldberger, 1973; Ram, 1982;
Gersovitz, 1988).
In the 1990s, Bloom and Williamson (1998), using growth regression models (also known as conver-
gence models), showed that East Asia's economic miracle was in part a consequence of demographics.
They convincingly demonstrated that, after the rst stage of the demographic transition, when fertil-
ity starts to decline, per capita productive capacity is boosted because the working-age population grow
faster than the dependent population, leading to the so-called rst demographic dividend. In the same line
of research, Kelley and Smith (2005) decomposed the demographic eect into a productivity component
and a translation component. They found that, when the two components are combined, demography
accounts for 20% of per capita output growth world-wide. Unfortunately, because the growth regression
models suer from endogeneity problems in the factor accumulation variables (Feyrer, 2007), researchers
prefer to use growth models with microfoundations or general equilibrium overlapping generation models.
Thus far, computable OLG growth models with xed household size have found no signicant eect
of demography on Japan's national saving rate (Hayashi and Prescott, 2002; Chen et al., 2006, 2007).
However, since in these models fertility does not aect individuals' utility function and budget constraints,
these results could have been anticipated (d'Albis, 2007; Lau, 2009). More relevant are the results obtained
by Braun et al. (2009) for Japan. By introducing changing family size and endogenously determined
interest rates, they found a small eect of demography on economic growth during the last four decades
of the 20th century. Nevertheless, Braun et al. (2009) also found that the demographic eect will become
progressively more important with population aging. Similar ndings have been obtained by R os-Rull
(2001) for Spain and by Krueger and Ludwig (2006) for the world, in contrast to Poterba (2001). Using
an OLG model with youth dependency and a xed interest rate, Lee et al. (2000, 2001, 2003) found
a signicant eect of demography on Taiwan's saving rates; and, more recently, Curtis et al. (2011)
showed that China's high saving rates are primarily driven by changes in family size. These results are
consistent with those of (Attanasio and Weber, 2010; Browning and Lusardi, 1996). Unfortunately, since
Lee et al. (2000, 2001, 2003) and Curtis et al. (2011) xed the interest rate, and hence the way that
demography aects the productivity component, the results obtained by Curtis et al. (2011) are not
2directly comparable to those obtained by Braun et al. (2009). Nonetheless, despite the lack of consensus,
there is one clear conclusion from the most recent computable OLG growth models: the introduction of
more realistic demography into OLG models increases the economic-demographic connection.
In this paper, I reconcile the computable OLG growth models with the growth regression models
using the Taiwanese economy.1 My reason for doing so is simple. According to the rst demographic
dividend, an increase in the share of the working-age population promotes economic growth. Hence, the
economic growth does not start until the rst post-baby boom cohort has entered the labor market (i.e.,
in general, 20 years after the onset of the decline in fertility). However, the most common approach in
computable OLG growth models is to run counterfactual experiments, xing vital rates at the beginning
of the economic analysis (Hayashi and Prescott, 2002; Chen et al., 2006, 2007; Braun et al., 2009), rather
than xing the rates at least one generation before. As a consequence, the eect of demography on
economic growth is underestimated.
To illustrate this point, I use a computable general equilibrium model inhabited by 100 overlapping
generations. In line with Chen et al. (2006, 2007) and Braun et al. (2009), I assume that individuals
consume and save according to the life-cycle hypothesis of Modigliani and Brumberg (1954), and face
mortality risk and borrowing constraints (Yaari, 1965). Bequests are unintentional and are received from
the expected parent. In addition, the model setup incorporates important public and private transfers
such as public consumption, childrearing costs, and familial old-age support. In order to control for the
eect of the educational transition in Taiwan, I consider that individuals dier by educational attainment.2
Data on labor eciency by educational group, as well as on educational distribution by birth cohort for
Taiwan, are taken from Huang (2001). Thus, the productivity measure takes into account quality and
age dierences in the physical and human capital stock (Feyrer, 2007).
In order to perform the procedure suggested in this paper for estimating the eect of demography on
economic growth, two additional requirements must be met. First, OLG growth models need demographic
data dating back before the economic information is available, which limits the number of countries for
which this analysis can be conducted. Second, because we will not, in general, have an initial wealth
prole, the initial steady-state will have to be derived by starting the simulation with a stable population.3
In seeking to meet these two additional requirements, Taiwan is of special interest. For Taiwan, we have
access to reliable economic data since 1951 and sucient demographic information during a large part
of the country's demographic transition. Moreover, Taiwan is also interesting because it experienced the
most rapid economic growth of any country for the period 1960-2000. In 1960, the real per capita GDP
was $1.430; by 2000, it had risen by a factor of 17 (Barro and Sala-i-Mart n, 2004). To overcome the lack
of information on family size by age and over time I introduce two demographic methods widely-used in
population reconstruction: Inverse Projection (IP) and Generalized Inverse-Projection (GIP) (Lee, 1985;
Oeppen, 1993).
The results obtained from simulations are in line with the population revisionist position. I nd that
population accounts for 22% of Taiwan's per capita output growth, 16.4% of its investment rate, and 18.5%
of its saving rate for the period 1965-2005. In line with previous literature, counterfactual experiments
1This result can be extended to other countries. The reason for focusing on Taiwan, rather than on Japan, is because
Taiwan started the demographic transition in the 20th century.
2Taiwan's demographic transition started in the 1920s, 40 years before the economic boom. In 1944, the constitution of
the Republic of China established six years of compulsory education, and this period was extended to nine years in 1968.
As a result, the proportion of illiterate and self-educated people changed from 40% in 1940 to almost 0% in 1970 (Huang,
2001).
3All requirements for a steady-state equilibrium will then be satised.
3show that fertility alone explains the impact of demographic changes in per capita output growth, while
mortality has no signicant inuence throughout the period analyzed (Bloom and Freeman, 1986; Brander
and Dowrick, 1994; Barlow, 1994; Kelley and Schmidt, 1995; Bloom and Williamson, 1998). However, the
eect of demography on saving and investment is somehow less straightforward. Assuming a small-open
economy, I nd that investment rates increase with more rapid population growth, while saving rates are
explained by the dependence hypothesis (Coale and Hoover, 1958; Williamson and Higgins, 2001). By
contrast, under a closed-economy, lower mortality and lower fertility have the opposite eect on saving
and investment rates.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model setup. In Section
3, I present the economic and demographic data and discuss the calibration process. In Section 4, I
demonstrate that this model is capable of reproducing Taiwan's national accounts data from 1965 to
2005. Section 5 is devoted to showing and explaining the inuence of demography on output per capita,




Time is discrete. Let t 2 ft0;t0 + 1;:::;Tg denote time, where t0 and T are the rst and last years at
which the population is computed. The economy is comprised of a nite number of individuals at each
time t. Individuals can live at most 
 years (maximum longevity). Let x denote age, x 2 f0;:::;
g.





is the survival probability at age x in year t, l;0 = 1, l;
 = 0, and t;x is the conditional probability (of
being alive at age x in year t) of surviving to age x + 1 (with ;x = 0, for all x  
).
Let Nt denote the total population size in year t and Nt;x be the size of the population at age x in
year t. I assume a closed population whose law of motion (or \balancing equation") is given by4
Nt+1 = Nt + Bt   Dt: (2)
Population at time t + 1 is given by the population in year t plus the total number of births in year t,
denoted Bt, less the total number of deaths during the year Dt. The dynamics of the population can be
written in matrix notation using a Leslie matrix (Leslie, 1945; Preston et al., 2002)














; for x 2 f1;:::;
   1g at time t;
(4)
4The population of Taiwan was reconstructed using historical data from 1906 to 2010. During the rst half of the 20th
century, Taiwan experienced massive in- and out-migration ows, which are explained in Section 3.1. I have run simulations
under both closed and open populations. However, similar to Lee et al. (2000), I use a closed population because the results
do not change signicantly and are less noisy.
4where Lt;x =
lt;x+lt;x+1
2 is the person years lived by the cohort between ages x and x + 1 in period t,
ft;x is the age-specic fertility rate at age x in year t, ffab is the fraction of females at birth (I assume
ffab = 0:4886, which is the standard value in the demographic literature).
2.2 Firm's problem
Firms combine capital and labor using a Cobb-Douglas constant returns to scale production function to




where Yt is output, Kt is the stock of capital, Ht is the eective aggregate labor input, and  t is labor-
augmenting technological progress. Aggregate capital stock evolves according to the law of motion:
Kt+1 = Kt(1   t) + It; (6)
where t is the depreciation rate of capital and It is aggregate gross investment. We assume that rms
pay corporate taxes and maximize their net cash ow by renting capital and hiring labor from households
in competitive markets at the rates rt and wt, respectively. The net cash ow of the rm is given by
Xt = Yt   wtHt   It: (7)
Thus, labor and capital inputs are chosen by rms according to the rst-order conditions:








All households have one adult, or household head, and a number of dependent children with ages ranging
from 0 to 19. The number of children raised by the household head varies over time, either because
of mortality and fertility or because children leave their parental home, setting up a new household,
at age 20 (Tw). If the household head dies, the economic unit vanishes and the surviving dependent
ospring are borne by a dierent household with similar characteristics. The additional burden for the
new household is mitigated by the receipt of the assets of the deceased adult. We assume that individuals
exogenously supply their labor force ht;x until retirement at age 60 (Tr).5 Labor in eciency units at age
x is conditional on the educational attainment "j
x.6 In line with D az-Gim enez and D az-Saavedra (2009),
I assume that when individuals enter the labor market, they are randomly assigned to an educational
level group according to an educational distribution by birth cohort (see Figure 3(b) in Section 3.2).
I assume that household heads are selsh and begin with zero assets at;Tw = 0. I also assume that
there is no annuity market. Under this setup, it is well known that individuals will leave accidental
5Since during the period analyzed unemployment rates were low in Taiwan (close to 2%), savings are not aected by
labor uncertainty. Therefore, for simplicity, I have taken as ht;x values actual employment rates by age.
6Taiwan experienced a dramatic increase in human capital accumulation for cohorts born between the 1940s and the
1970s (Huang, 2001). In order to capture the eect that human capital heterogeneity has on economic growth, I have
included six dierent educational levels E =fIlliterate and self-educated, elementary school, junior middle school, senior
high school, vocational school, and college and aboveg, where j 2 E. The age-specic labor productivity indexes by
educational attainment are calculated based on Huang (2001, Table 11.3).
5bequests at death (Yaari, 1965). Preferences are concave (i.e., u0 > 0, u00 < 0), additive, and identical

















t+1;x+1 + wtx + 
j
t;x  (1 + rt)(a
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xht;x if Tw  x < Tr;
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t;x if Tw  x < Tr;





t;x if Tr  x < 
;
(14)
with ct;x  0 and the boundary conditions at x+Tw;Tw = 0 and at x+
;
  0.
In this problem, there is one state variable a
j
t;x, or assets held by an individual with education j at
age x in year t, and one control variable c
j
t;x, or consumption at age x in year t of a household head
with education j.  is the subjective discount factor, wtx is private expenditures on own education
and health care, and 
j
t;x is total household taxes paid. The ow budget constraint (11) states that
asset holdings at the end of the period increase because of the capitalization of previous asset holdings
(1 + rt)at;x, bequests received (1 + rt)bt;x, labor income (net of social contributions) while in the labor
force or retirement benets if retired yl
j
t;x, and net non-capital familial transfers received 
j
t;x. On the
other hand, at+1;x+1 decreases because of the household head consumption c
j
t;x, private expenditures on




t;x) and labor ltwt"j
xht;x, where c
t;x is the number of dependent children, in units of equivalent
adult consumers, within a household whose head is x years old at time t.
Familial transfers are comprised of familial transfer wealth (i.e., bequests) and non-capital familial
transfers. To realistically model inheritances, I assume that the bequest is distributed among the adult
surviving children. If there are no surviving adult ospring, the bequest is distributed within the cohort.
Non-capital familial transfers, , includes: i) childrearing costs (i.e., c
t;xc
j
t;x); ii) private health care and
education expenditures given wt

t;x and received wtx; and iii) familial old-age support paid by adult
children to the retired parent, where oas
t;x is the fraction of labor income of an individual of age x in year
t allocated to the nancial support of her elderly parent, oas is the familial old-age support rate, which
is a fraction of the average labor income of the adult ospring  yt;x.7
2.4 Government
The government provides health care, education, and other goods and services (infrastructure, defense,
etc.). Total government expenditure is
Gt = tYt; (15)
7In Taiwan, the majority of elderly people live with their children, and the country has one of the highest familial elderly
support expenditures per family member (Lee et al., 1994; Deaton and Paxson, 2000).
6where t is the fraction of public consumption relative to output in year t. To nance these expenditures,
the government levies taxes on labor (Tlt = ltwtHt), capital income (Tkt = ktrtKt), and consumption











where Et is the educational distribution of children born in year t (see Figure 3(b)).8 I assume that the
government budget is balanced at all times
Tt  Tlt + Tkt + Tct = Gt: (17)
In order to guarantee that Equation (17) holds, I assume that consumption taxes nance the gap between
public consumption expenditures and capital income tax and labor income tax revenues.
Our government also provides retirement benets. I assume that pension benets are proportional to
the average wage during its last three years, denoted by Nb, and are constant during retirement. The
benets received by a retiree are given by
br
j






xht;x; for x  Tr; (18)
where   is the replacement ratio of the pension benet and $ is the proportion of income insured. To
nance the aggregate pension benets claimed, the government levies social contributions on current


















where st is the social contribution rate in year t.




t=t0, a recursive competitive equilibrium with transfers is a set of house-










x=0 over t 2 ft0;:::;Tg,
government policy functions fGt;ct;kt;lt;st;Nb; ;$gT
t=t0, and factor prices fwt;rtgT
t=t0 such that
 household policy functions solve the dynamic program (10)-(14), given the factor prices, government
policy functions, and familial transfers.



















t;xdEt x = 0: (21)
 factor prices equal their marginal productivities, so that (8) and (9) hold.
 the government's budget constraints (17) and (19) are satised in each period.
8Let Et(j) be the cumulative distribution function of the educational attainment of an individual born in year t. Thus,
for any j 2 E, Et(j) is dened as Pr(education of an individual born in year t is equal to or less than j).





















where Ft is the value of internationally traded bonds.
 the commodity market clears:
GDPt + rtFt = Ct + Gt + It; (24)
where Ct is aggregate consumption and GDPt = Yt + Tct is the gross domestic product in year t.
3 Data and calibration
The point of departure of this paper is that demographic data have not been fully exploited. As a
result, an underestimation of the eect of demography on economic growth has generally been made in
overlapping generations models. The rst reason for considering a long time series of demographic data
is that it is necessary to have a stable population to guarantee both an initial and a nal steady state
economy. This implies that we need to derive an initial stable population that evolves consistently with
actual population data. It should be noted that, by starting and nishing the simulation with a stable
population, the model nds both the initial and the nal steady state interest rates. Consequently, I do
not need to impose an initial wealth prole, which might not be consistent with the household's problem.
The second reason for using a long time series is that, in order to assess the eect of demographic
changes on economic growth, we need demographic data that date back at least one generation before
the economic data are available. This point will be shown in Section 4. Next, I explain the calibration
process of demographic and economic data.
3.1 Demography
I combine two demographic methods widely used in population reconstruction: Inverse Projection (IP)
and Generalized Inverse Projection (GIP) (Lee, 1985; Oeppen, 1993). GIP is a non-linear optimization
that produces constrained demographic projections with a priori information (Oeppen, 1993).9 GIP
9Since the economic model does not distinguish between gender, parity, region, etc.; I use a simplied version of a GIP











































































































x are actual age-
specic fertility rates and conditional survival probability by age for specic years; and I  fD;B;N;E;T;Cg are the sets of
8suers from weak ergodicity, which implies that there are innite initial population structures that are
consistent with the nal population. To avoid this problem, I calculated an initial population using
\stable population theory" (Lotka, 1939), which is consistent with pre-demographic transition data in
Taiwan (Lee et al., 2000, see Table 1).10 The results from the GIP model gives age-specic fertility rates
ft;x, conditional survival probabilities t;x, and population by age Nt from the year 1650 (t0) to the
year 2009. Population projections from the year 2010 onwards are based on United Nations assumptions.
After the year 2050 all vital rates are kept constant until the population becomes stable. Later on, the
demographic information is used to reconstruct the household size (i.e., family scale) and the demographic
relationships needed to calculate the familial transfers involved in the economic model (i.e., parenthood,
number of ospring, siblings, etc.).
As a priori information, I collected data on population size, births, and deaths for the periods 1906-
1942 and 1947-2005 from the Taiwan-Fukien Demographic Fact Book, the Ministry of the Interior R.O.C.;
and for the year 2006 to the year 2009, from the Human Mortality Database (HMD). As population
references, I use population by age for selected years f1956,1966,1970,1975,1980,1990,2000, 2009g taken
from HMD. Age-specic fertility rates (ASFR) from 1962 to 2006 are taken from the Directorate-General
of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan (DGBAS) and death rates and life expectancy at
birth are drawn from the HMD and the Human Life-Table Database. Life expectancy at birth and ASFR
prior to 1926 and 1962 are based on data provided by Lee et al. (2000, see Figure 2). Crude migration
rates are estimated using IP from 1905 to 2009 (see Figure 1(a)). Fitted demographic data are depicted
in Figures 1(b)-1(d).
The discrepancy in the total fertility rate between the GIP estimates and those taken from Lee et al.
(2000) are due to the introduction of migration. Lee et al. (2000) assumed a closed population, while I
consider an open population for the population reconstruction. Thus, the immigration ow compensates
for the lower fertility in order to maintain the same population size.
3.2 Economy
I calibrate the model to the Taiwanese economy using national accounts data from 1951 to 2009 published
by the DGBAS. Capital share  is set to 0.26, based on Young (1995). The subjective discount factor
is set to one (Lee et al., 2000; Boucekkine et al., 2002), and the constant risk aversion coecient is set
to four (Lee et al., 2000).11 Capital stock is obtained by applying the perpetual inventory approach to
gross xed capital formation (GFCF) by category fconstruction, transport equipment, machinery and
equipment, and intangible xed assetsg. The capital stock at the beginning of the period is computed as
Ki(0) = Ii(0)=(i + gi), where Ii(0) is the initial investment in category i, i is the depreciation rate of
category i, and gi is the growth rate of investment in the rst 10 years in category i. The depreciation
rates applied to each category are 2.1%, 18.2%, 13.8%, and 15%, respectively (Hulten and Wyko,
1981). Using this information, I set the depreciation rate to 5%, which is consistent with the average
depreciation rate and the consumption of xed capital formation (CFC) reported by the DGBAS for the
deaths, births, total population, life expectancy, total fertility rates, and censuses used in the calculation. Crude migration
rates are obtained using inverse population projection and are exogenous to the GIP model.
10Based on Taiwanese data, Lee et al. (2000) observed an annual population growth rate of 1.1%, a life expectancy at
birth of 28.3 years, and a total fertility rate of six births per woman.
11A sensitivity analysis conducted for this variable showed that lower risk aversion values yield a higher capital-to-output
ratio for the reference years, which does not match the actual capital-to-output data from the DGBAS.










(a) Crude migration rate






































(c) Total fertility rate
















(d) Life expectancy at birth
Figure 1: Population Reconstruction, Taiwan 1900-2010
period 1960-2009.12 I calculated the labor-augmenting technological progress by applying the formula:
 t = 1=(1   )lnYt=Nt   =(1   )lnKt=Nt   lnHt=Nt; (27)
where Ht is quality-adjusted aggregate labor input and Yt is GDP net of indirect taxes (Sun, 2006).
Figure 2 depicts the estimated labor-augmenting technological progress. Before 1951, it is assumed that
 t grows at an annual rate of 1.5%, and after 2010 I assume that  t grows at an annual rate of 3%, which
is close to the average value between 1951 to 2009.


















































Figure 2: Labor-augmenting technological progress
Source: Author's calculations based on DGBAS data.
12The dierence between the estimated and actual CFC gives an average error of 1% from 1966 to 2005. Since the capital
stock derived is insensitive to the method used after 15 years, I focus my analysis on the economic performance of Taiwan
from 1965 to 2005.
10The adjustment of the number of eective employees is calculated by combining age-eciency pro-
les for dierent educational groups, fj
xg
Tr
x=Tw, obtained from Huang (2001, Table 11.3), educational
distribution by birth cohort from Huang (2001, Table 11.1), employment rates by age from the DGBAS,
fht;xg
Tr 1
x=Tw, and the working-age population from the demographic model. The educational distribution
and age-specic productivity indexes are shown in Figure 3. I assume that the educational distribution
does not change before the cohort born in 1926 and after the cohort born in 1970.13






























































(a) Age-specic productivity index by educa-
tional attainment

















(b) The educational distribution
Figure 3: The educational distribution
Source: (Huang, 2001, Tables 11.1 and 11.3)
In this model, the rental price of capital is exogenous. Given that the capital share was roughly
constant (Young, 1995; Hsieh, 2002), I calculated the rental price of capital from 1965 to 2009 using
Equation (8). According to the dashed line in Figure 5(d), the average real interest rate from 1965 to
2009 was 10%, starting at 18.4% in 1965 and rapidly declining to 4.5% in the year 2005. This pattern is
consistent with the hypothesis that factor accumulation largely explains the economic growth in Taiwan
(Barro et al., 1995). Moreover, I also calculated the interest rate, assuming a closed economy for several
reasons. First, this assumption was necessary in order to study the eect that openness had on Taiwan's
economic growth and household saving. Second, I wished to compute the initial steady state of the
economy before the demographic transition started. Third, since a reliable rental price of capital cannot
be computed before year 1965, it was necessary to assume that the economy was closed until 1965.
Therefore, before 1965 I use the interest rate endogenously determined by the model assuming a closed
economy.
Government consumption relative to output (t), the capital income tax rate (kt), and the labor
income tax rate (lt) from 1951 to 2009 is calculated using data from the DGBAS. The parametric
components of the Taiwanese pension system are based on information reported by Tsui (2002). I set
the proportion of income insured by the social insurance at 80% ($), the number of years used for
computing the pension benets to three (Nb), and the replacement rate to 15% ( ). This last value
corresponds to the sum of the replacement rates for the two major social insurance programs in Taiwan:
13This assumption does not change the results for the period analyzed: 1965-2005.
11Labor Insurance (LI) and Government Employee's Insurance (GEI). LI covers approximately 50% of
the working population, and its replacement rate is 20%; while GEI covers 14% of the population, and


















Figure 4: Number of equivalent adult consumers by age of household head, Taiwan 1900-2100
Source: Author's calculations.
Non-capital private transfers consist of childrearing costs, private health care, private education, and







lt;x sx s  Ix s; (28)
where x is a continuous scale that equals 0.4 from ages 0-4, and rises with age until reaching one at the
age of 18 (Mueller, 1976). Ix s is an index function that takes the value of one when x   s is lower than
Tw and zero otherwise. Similarly, the cost of private health care and education for children is calculated
by substituting  with . Given that  values are not constant over time, and that NTA data do not
cover the whole period analyzed, I calculated t;x values, scaling at each period a common NTA prole
to the total private expenditure on education and health care reported by the DGBAS. Following Chu
and Yu (2007), the familial old-age support rate is set at 8.75%, which is the average income transferred
to elderly parents estimated from the Panel Study of Family Dynamics (PSFD).
Table 1 summarizes the model economy parameters.
4 Matching the macroeconomic data of Taiwan
Before explaining the contribution of demography to economic growth, it is crucial to demonstrate that
this model is capable of reproducing actual national accounts data. Taiwan has been of special interest
along with other East Asian economies, such as Hong Kong, South Korea, and Singapore, because of its
surprisingly high output per capita growth, averaging a 6.2% per annum for four decades, and the sharp
increase in saving, from 5% to over 30%, after World War II.
Several attempts have been made to explain the rapid increase in saving rates in Taiwan for the period
1965-2000 (Kelley and Schmidt, 1996; Higgins and Williamson, 1997; Lee et al., 2000; Deaton and Paxson,
12Table 1: Model economy parameters
Symbol Value
Household
Risk aversion  4
Subjective discount factor  1 Lee et al. (2000)
and Boucekkine et al. (2002)
Age at parental leave Tw 20 Lee et al. (2000)
Retirement age Tr 60 Lee et al. (2000)
Transfers
Consumption units x Mueller (1976)
Private education and health x NTA and DGBAS
Familial old-age support oas 8.75% Chu and Yu (2007)
Technology
Capital share  0.26 Young (1995)
Depreciation rate t DGBAS
Rental price of capital rt DGBAS
Productivity At DGBAS
Labor eciency prole x Huang (2001)
Educational attainment Et Huang (2001)
Employment rates ht;x DGBAS
Government
Public consumption to output  DGBAS
Corporate income tax to output k DGBAS
Labor income tax to output l DGBAS
Number of years of contribution Nb 3 Tsui (2002)
Pension replacement rate   15% Tsui (2002)
Labor income insured $ 80% Tsui (2002)
132000). However, all simulations failed in their attempt to replicate the evolution of saving. Similarly, the
reasons behind the rapid growth in per capita output have been widely debated, with several explanations
being suggested - such as productivity (Hsieh, 2002; Sun, 2006), input factor accumulation (Krugman,
1994; Young, 1995), and demography (Bloom and Williamson, 1998).
Table 2 shows the data collected from national accounts and the baseline results. The labor-augmenting
technological progress averaged 2.9% for the period 1965-2005 and 3.2% for the period 1965-1990; or,
equivalently, there was a TFP growth rate of 2.4%, which is slightly smaller than the rate reported by
Hsieh (2002) and slightly higher than the rate reported by Young (1995).14 There are various reasons for
the dierence in productivity levels. First, the estimation method applied here does not account for the
contribution of each industry in TFP; instead, it does so at an aggregate level. Second, the estimations
include all sectors, whereas Young (1995) excludes agriculture. Last but not least, in order to be consis-
tent with the theoretical model, Ht does not take into account the number of hours worked. Aggregate
capital accumulation and aggregate labor are, respectively, 1% and 0.5% smaller than those obtained by
Young (1995, see Table IX).
Table 2: Macroeconomic Performance in Taiwan, 1965-2005.
Output Output Capital Labor Population Productivity Net Household
per capita Aug. investment saving
(Y=N) (Y ) (K) (H) (N) ( )
Data
1965-1970 6.6 9.0 14.5 3.9 2.4 3.3 14.8 21.7
1971-1980 7.4 9.4 14.7 4.7 2.0 2.9 20.6 30.4
1981-1990 6.6 7.9 9.4 4.3 1.3 3.0 19.0 33.1
1991-2000 5.6 6.4 9.2 2.5 0.9 2.9 22.4 25.7
2001-2005 4.2 4.9 4.1 2.3 0.4 2.9 12.8 22.0
1965-2005 6.2 7.6 10.6 3.6 1.4 2.9 18.8 27.6
Baseline
1965-1970 4.5 6.8 5.6 3.9 2.4 3.3 8.6 28.1
1971-1980 7.5 9.5 14.3 4.7 2.0 2.9 20.6 33.4
1981-1990 6.6 7.9 9.4 4.3 1.3 3.0 19.2 32.1
1991-2000 5.5 6.4 9.1 2.5 0.9 2.9 22.5 32.2
2001-2005 4.5 4.9 4.0 2.3 0.4 2.9 12.8 26.0
1965-2005 6.0 7.4 9.6 3.6 1.4 2.9 18.2 31.2
Note: All values are percentages. The rst six columns are annual growth rates. Source: Author's
calculations based on information from the DGBAS.
Figure 5 displays the baseline economy results for the period 1965-2005. The gure is divided into
four panels that show household savings behavior, net investment, the capital-output ratio, and the real
interest rate. In Panels 5(a)-5(b), the solid-black line depicts the baseline economy results, while the
observed statistics and those calculated from national accounts are represented by a dashed-blue line.
Since our baseline model is based on national accounts data, in Panel 5(d) the rental price of capital is
represented by a dashed-blue line instead.15
The baseline model reproduces the observed rates well. For instance, the baseline economy replicates
perfectly net investment rates and capital-output ratios from 1970 to 2005. Since both the capital share
14The values of TFP chosen correspond to those obtained using the primal approach.
15Using (5) and (8), the rental price of capital is given by rt + t = (Yt=Kt):
























(a) Household saving rate




















(b) Net investment rate






























(d) Rental price of capital (net of depreciation)
Figure 5: In-sample performance of the model, Taiwan 1965-2005
Source: DGBAS and author's calculations.
Note: Following Deaton and Paxson (2000), household saving rates are calculated as private savings,
divided by the sum of private savings plus private consumption. It should be noted that the sum of private
savings plus private consumption can easily be derived by combining the market-clearing condition (24)
and the government budget (17), which, under a constant returns to scale production function, is equal
to household disposable income
(1   lt)wtHt + (1   kt)rtAt = Ct + St; (29)
where At denotes households' nancial wealth in year t, i.e. At = Kt + Ft. Therefore, household
saving rate is equivalent to dividing the household's saving by the household's disposable income. Net
investment rates are calculated as the net investment to output (net of capital depreciation) ratio, i.e.,
(Kt+1   Kt)=(Yt   tKt).
15and the capital depreciation rate were roughly constant during the period analyzed (Hsieh, 2002), the
fact that Taiwan was a small open economy caused these two macroeconomic variables to evolve in line
with the internationally determined interest rate. By contrast, the tting of output per capita growth
(see the rst column in Table 2) is due to the labor-augmenting technological progress and demographics.
Panel 5(a) shows that household saving rates also increase from the 1960s to the 1990s, and slowly decline
thereafter. Nevertheless, baseline household savings are on average 3.6% higher than those observed in
the actual national accounts (see the last column in Table 2). In Panel 5(d), a negative dierence in
interest rates between the baseline and the closed economy assumption can be seen, which corresponds
to the fact that Taiwan is a net receiver of foreign capital during the period analyzed.16 Thus, the
calibration strategy has been to nd the elasticity of substitution that minimizes the dierence between
observed and simulated household savings and investment, and that preserves the net dependency on
foreign capital.17
5 Counterfactual experiments
In this section, I investigate the contribution of fertility and mortality on income growth and saving
rates.18 To do so, I build four alternative demographies based on the underlying demographic data
obtained in Section 3.1.
Experiment 1. (Vital rates xed in 1965). I construct a population assuming that the vital rates
in 1965 (i.e., mortality rates and fertility rates) would have remained constant after 1965. The new
population grows in the long run at an annual rate of 2.75%. Individuals have a life expectancy of 68
years and have an average of 2.45 children (or a TFR of 4.9).
Experiment 2. (Vital rates xed in 1900). The assumptions are exactly the same as in Experiment
1, but now I x the vital rates in 1900. Individuals live from birth for an average of 27 years, and have
three children (or a TFR of six). As a consequence, the population growth rate is equal to 1% per year.
It should be noted that, although the life expectancy at birth is 27 years, once an individual survives to
age ve, he or she has nearly 41 remaining years of live.
Experiment 3. (Fixed mortality since 1900). This population is constructed by taking actual fertility
and migration data and assuming that the mortality rates in 1900 are held constant over time. Thus,
individuals have a life expectancy of 27 years, and, because fertility rates fall below replacement levels,
population growth rates become negative from 1970 onwards.
Experiment 4. (Fixed fertility since 1900). This population projection assumes that fertility rates
from 1900 are held constant over time, while mortality and migration rates are the observed rates. Life
expectancy and migration rates are depicted in Panels 1(d) and 1(a), respectively. Under this scenario,
a constant TFR of six, or three children per individual, yields positive and increasing population growth
rates, with a nal stable population growth of 3.75% per year.
16Indeed, net factor income from abroad represents around 2% annually of the output in Taiwan since the 1980s.
17It should be noted that a higher elasticity of substitution yields not only a lower interest rate, but also the nding that
Taiwanese households are net investors in foreign capital markets, which is not supported by SNA data.
18The same analysis has been done with migration. However, the contribution of this demographic process during the
period analyzed (i.e., 1965-2005) is negligible. Thus, I opted to not report the results in the paper for the sake of space.
165.1 Demographics: The Role of Timing
In the literature, two variables are frequently used to study the impact of demographic changes on eco-
nomic growth: output per capita and investment. Output per capita growth is inuenced by demography
through changes in dependency rates. High youth dependency rates decrease per capita income growth
because there are fewer producers relative to consumers, an eect known as the youth demographic bur-
den (Bloom and Williamson, 1998). This occurs in the early phase of the demographic transition, when
mortality declines and fertility remains high. When fertility starts falling, youth dependency rates decline
and per capita income rises due to a rapid increase in the input factors (capital and labor). This second
process is known as the rst demographic dividend or demographic gift (Higgins and Williamson, 1997).
Later, low fertility and mortality lead to an increase in the old-dependency rate. As a consequence, the
share of the working-age population decreases, which, under the right policies, leads to an increase in
capital per worker, an eect known as the second demographic dividend (Mason and Lee, 2006).
In a small open economy, investment is aected by demography through changes in the eective labor
growth rate.19 It implies that one specic cohort aects investment rates from Tw to Tr years after being
born.20 To illustrate this point, Panel 6(a) shows the growth rate of eective aggregate labor input under
three dierent demographic scenarios: 1) baseline model or observed demography (black solid line); 2)
Experiment 1: constant mortality and fertility rates as observed in 1965 from that period onwards (dash
crossed red line); and 3) Experiment 2: constant mortality and fertility rates as in 1900 (solid circled
red line). It can be seen that the dierence in eective labor and investment rates between the observed
demography and Experiment 1 is negligible during the rst 20 years (see Panels 6(a) and 6(b)). However,
by comparing the baseline model to Experiment 1, it becomes clear that the eective labor grew 2%-2.5%
faster because of changes in demography, which raised investment on average by 4%. After the year 1985,
Experiment 1 yields a higher eective aggregate labor, raising investment rates over rates in the baseline
economy. From the years 1965 to 2005, the overall contribution of demography to investment is positive
and equal to 16.6% using Experiment 2, while the contribution of demography turns out to be negative
and smaller (-10%) under Experiment 1. This clearly show the errors made in attempts to measure the
inuence of demography on saving rates.
An identical timing eect is observed in per capita output growth (~ ygr). Following an approach similar
to those of Bloom and Williamson (1998) and Kelley and Smith (2005), Equation (31) shows that the
relationship between demography and output per capita is given by21
~ ygr = ygr + Hgr   Ngr; (31)
where subscript gr denotes the growth rate and y is eective output.
Table 3 reports the demographic contribution to per capita output growth. Like the eect on in-
vestment rates, the estimated contribution of demography on g~ y is smaller in Experiment 1 than in

















where t is eective capital in year t. It should be noted that, in a small open economy, eective capital is determined
exogenously by competitive international capital markets, and  t is exogenously given in the model.
20In a closed economy, one cohort can inuence the saving rate throughout their lifespan. However, the cohort members
do not have a strong eect on eective capital until they enter the labor market.
21Unlike Equation (4) in Bloom and Williamson (1998, p. 431), in this model, the demographic contribution to output
per capita is given by the productivity component and by the dierence between the growth of the eective labor and the
growth rate of the population (Kelley and Smith, 2005).























































Figure 6: Demographic impact on investment, Taiwan 1965-2005
Experiment 2. This is because population growth has an initial inertia, which makes the dierence in
~ ygr between the baseline model and Experiment 1 smaller than that in Experiment 2 during the rst two
decades; exactly the time newborns need to start entering the labor market.
Table 3: Demographic contribution to per capita output growth (in %)




















1965-1970 4.5 4.0 10.2 3.4 23.6
1971-1980 7.5 6.4 15.1 5.4 28.1
1981-1990 6.6 5.0 24.1 5.1 22.4
1991-2000 5.5 4.8 12.6 4.7 14.1
2001-2005 4.5 3.9 13.4 3.7 17.8
1965-2005 6.0 5.0 16.6 4.7 22.1
Importantly, by using the correct counterfactual demography, i.e., Experiment 2, Table 3 shows that
demography contributes 22% of the output per capita growth (period 1965-2005) in a small open economy,
instead of the contribution of 16.6% estimated using Experiment 1.
5.2 Demographics and per capita output growth
To assess the eect that a demographic variable `x' has on output per capita growth, I assume that `x'
had remained constant since the year 1900, whereas the rest of components are the observed ones. Then,
for each demographic component, a new population is derived using Equation (3), i.e., Experiments 3
and 4. Before proceeding to comments on the results in Table 4, it is important to keep in mind that each
demographic component does not aect economic growth linearly. Hence, the sum of the contribution to
per capita output growth by each component does not necessarily need to match Experiment 2.
18Table 4: Contribution to per capita output growth by demographic component (in %)




















1965-1970 4.5 4.4 1.1 3.2 27.6
1971-1980 7.5 7.1 5.6 5.5 26.5
1981-1990 6.6 6.4 2.4 5.1 22.6
1991-2000 5.5 5.4 2.1 4.8 13.0
2001-2005 4.5 4.4 2.3 3.8 16.1
1965-2005 6.0 5.8 3.2 4.7 21.6
Clearly, at least in a small open economy, fertility stands out as the main contributor to output
per capita growth, while mortality has a small eect (see Table 4).22 This result is consistent with the
\population revisionist" position (Bloom and Freeman, 1986; Brander and Dowrick, 1994; Barlow, 1994;
Kelley and Schmidt, 1995; Bloom and Williamson, 1998). During the period 1965-2005, mortality had
no impact on economic growth because mortality aects both the growth rate of the population and the
growth rate of the eective labor. Thus, the positive eect of having more surviving workers is oset
by the negative eect of more surviving children and women in their fertile years.23 In Taiwan, for
instance, the infant mortality rate declined from 16.3 per thousand in the year 1970 to 5.4 per thousand
in the year 2005. Unlike mortality, fertility does not aect the growth rate of the population to the
same extent as the growth rate of workers. In general, a fertility increase raises the growth rate of the
population in the short run, and then it raises the growth rate of workers, but not the growth rate of the
population. As a consequence, a rapid fertility change has an initial negative economic eect (known as
the youth dependency burden), and a subsequent positive economic impact, or demographic bonus, when
the ospring enter the labor market. Table 4 shows how the fertility decline since the beginning of the
1950s aected output per capita growth positively during the period 1965-2005. Moreover, it should be
noted that fertility peaked in the 1970s and 1980s, exactly when per capita output growth reached its
maximum.
Before proceeding to the analysis of the impact of demography on investment and saving, it is im-
portant to remember that the impact of demography on the accumulation of capital is to some extent
canceled out by the openness assumption. Indeed, by assuming a closed economy, additional simulations
not presented in the paper show that the Taiwanese demography accounts for one-third of output per
capita growth, with a small negative eect of mortality (-4.4%) and a highly positive eect of fertility
(33.3%).
5.3 Saving, investment, and demographics
As was pointed out in the introduction, the most controversial area is the assessment of the role of
demography on saving and investment. In particular, how does demography inuence non-steady state
saving and investment rates? Before addressing this question, I wish to summarize some of the most
22The same results are obtained running similar counterfactual simulations starting in 1925 and in 1950.
23Simulation results not presented here show that the impact of mortality is greater at the rst and last stages of the
demographic transition. This result is consistent with Braun et al. (2009) for Japan.
19recent results on this topic under steady state conditions. According to Williamson and Higgins (2001),
there are two crucial variables: the population growth rate and the dependence on foreign capital. In
the context of a closed economy inhabited by a population of overlapping generations, fertility changes
have an ambiguous eect on the steady state capital (d'Albis, 2007). However, for observed historical
population growth rates, fertility negatively aects the steady state capital because the capital dilution
eect dominates the saving eect (Lau, 2009). Similarly, the impact of a change in mortality on the
steady-state capital is ambiguous depending upon the age at which mortality improves. If mortality
reductions happen after the reproductive span, population growth rate does not change, and so the saving
eect dominates the capital dilution eect. If, however, mortality reductions happen before menopause,
population growth rates change (since more fertile women survive), and the eect on the steady state
capital therefore becomes ambiguous.
In contrast, if we assume an open economy with perfect international capital mobility, saving rates
and investment rates are independent. Moreover, since the demand for nancial wealth is independent of
the capital stock, it is not guaranteed that the impact of demography on the investment rate will be the
same as the eect on the saving rate. These two facts suggest the need for a separate analysis of each rate
when one analyzes the impact of demography. On the one hand, according to Equation (30), the steady
state investment rate is positively related to the population growth rate. Therefore, mortality reductions
before menopause and lower fertility have an opposite eect on the steady state investment rate. It should
also be noted that, since a mortality reduction after menopause does not modify population growth, the
investment rate does not change. However, the population growth rate has an ambiguous eect on the
steady state saving rate (Williamson and Higgins, 2001). The overall eect depends on what is known as
the variable rate-of-growth eect (Fry and Mason, 1982; Mason, 1988).
It should be noted that these preliminary and theoretical results indicate that, regardless of the
dependence on foreign Capital, both mortality and fertility have an eect on saving and investment,
while Section 5.2 shows that mortality has almost no eect on per capita output growth during the
period analyzed. Second, the relationships stated above between demographics and both saving and
investment rates correspond to steady state economies. Surprisingly, the steady state analysis has been
frequently used to analyze transitional dynamics. However, the relationships under this setup do not
necessarily hold during transition dynamics. Third, dependent children are in general not considered in
the economy. As a consequence, we nd a continuous underestimation of the eect of demography on
saving rates (Curtis et al., 2011; Braun et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2000).
In this subsection, I extend the work done by Williamson and Higgins (2001) on saving and investment
behaviors during the demographic transition. Specically, I focus on the dierential eect of mortality
and fertility on saving and investment rates during the period 1965-2005 in Taiwan. To compare the
dierential eect of demography on saving and investment under dierent capital mobility assumptions, I
include three more simulations in which I assume a closed economy. To empirically illustrate the results,
Panels 7(a)-7(d) show under open and closed economies the eect of both demographic changes on saving
and investment rates in Taiwan.
Case: Small open economy. In Panel 7(a), Experiment 3 (circled solid line) and Experiment 4
(crossed solid line) are compared to the baseline model (blue solid line). It should be noted that rates
lower (higher) than the baseline rates mean a positive (negative) eect. This relationship is similar in
all panels, regardless of whether I refer to saving or investment. Consistent with Equation (30), lower
mortality raises investment rates by 5.5 percentage points, while lower fertility decreases investment rates
20by 2.6 percentage points (see the rst column in Table 5). Interestingly, under a small open economy,
the eect of lower mortality and lower fertility on saving is positive (see Panel 7(b)), 1.5% and 3.1%
respectively - which supports the dependence hypothesis (Coale and Hoover, 1958). Moreover, comparing
the eect of each component on saving and investment provides additional insights. For instance, the
fact that lower fertility has a negative eect on investment and a positive eect on saving suggests that
the stock of capital increases at the expense of households' nancial wealth. In other words, since under
a small open economy the investment rate is solely inuenced by the capital dilution eect, the change
in sign suggests that the saving eect dominates the capital dilution eect. Specically, the saving eect
represents a total change of 5.7% ( 3.1 - (-2.6)), while the capital dilution eect is equal to -2.6% (see
the last row, columns 1 and 2, Table 5). The overall eect of demographics on saving is 5.8% and 3%
on investment, which corresponds to a variation of 18.3% and 16.6%, respectively, with respect to the
baseline (see rst row, columns 1 and 2, in Table 5).
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Figure 7: Demographic Impact of Fertility and Mortality on Saving and Investment, Taiwan 1965-2005
Note: The net eect of a demographic change is given by the dierence between the experiment and the
baseline. Experiment 3 refers to a population in which life expectancy has not changed since 1900, while
Experiment 4 refers to a population in which fertility rates have not changed since 1900.
21Table 5: Absolute change in saving and investment rates by demographic component and dependency on
foreign capital (in %), Taiwan 1965-2005
Small open economy Closed economy
Investment Saving Investment Saving
Experiment 2 3.0 5.8 10.3 11.3
Experiment 3 (mortality) 5.5 1.5 -2.3 -5.6
Experiment 4 (fertility) -2.6 3.1 6.1 7.1
Source: Author's calculations. Note: Results presented in this table correspond to eects depicted in
Panels 7(b)-7(c) and not to the nal steady state economy. Under a closed economy, the impact of
mortality and fertility reductions on steady state saving and investment rates are found to be positive.
Case: Closed economy. It is well known that, under a closed economy, the impact of each demo-
graphic variable aects saving and investment similarly (see panels 7(c)-7(d)). To better distinguish
between closed and open economies, I use dashed lines in panels 7(c) and 7(d). Table 5 reports that lower
mortality negatively aects investment and saving (-2.3% and -5.6%, respectively), while lower fertility
boosts them (6.1% and 7.1%, respectively). Therefore, under a closed economy the two demographic
components have opposite eects.
The dierence in saving under a closed and an open economy stems from the dierence in the relative
price of input factors. In particular, Experiment 3 reports slightly higher interest rates than the baseline
economy before the 1970s and slightly lower interest rates after the 1990s. The dierence in interest rates
between Experiment 4 and the baseline economy diverges after 1975, with a steady state interest rate
that is equal to 18%. Under Experiment 2, the interest rate is always higher than the baseline and any
other experiment. As a result, the overall eects of the two demographic processes are to raise investment
and saving rates by 10% and 11%, respectively.
From this analysis, some interesting conclusions can be drawn. First, the Taiwanese demography
has contributed signicantly to the increases in investment (16.4%) and saving (18.5%) from 1965 to
2005. Second, the impact of demography on investment and saving was muted by the dependence on
foreign capital. Indeed, under a closed economy, demographic changes would have raised investment by
two-thirds and saving by one-third. Nevertheless, this result does not imply that openness would not
have contributed to economic growth. On the contrary, further simulation results also show that the
overall per capita output growth rate would have been slightly lower. Fourth, the impact of fertility and
mortality on investment and saving vary depending upon the dependence on foreign capital. And fth,
the dependency hypothesis coined by Coale and Hoover (1958) is conrmed.
6 Conclusion
The common approach to measuring the economic-demographic connection in computable OLG growth
models is to run counterfactual experiments xing vital rates (i.e., fertility and mortality rates) at the
beginning of the economic analysis (Chen et al., 2006, 2007; Braun et al., 2009). This paper shows that
this commonly used procedure leads to an underestimation of the eect of demography on economic
22growth. In order to correct this problem, I show that it is necessary to have demographic data at least
one generation before the period analyzed, which is exactly the time needed for a newborn to enter the
labor market.
With sucient demographic information, the results obtained in this paper are similar to those esti-
mated using \convergence models" (Bloom and Williamson, 1998; Kelley and Smith, 2005). In particular,
I nd that demography accounts for 22% of Taiwan's per capita output growth, 16.4% of the increase in
investment, and 18.5% of the increase in saving during the period 1965-2005.
In line with previous literature, the counterfactual experiments conducted show that fertility is the
most important demographic factor in explaining the increase in per capita output growth, and that
mortality has no signicant inuence on this economic variable from 1965 to 2005. However, the eect
of demography on saving and investment is less straightforward. Assuming a small open economy, I nd
that investment rates increase with more rapid population growth, while saving rates are explained by the
dependence hypothesis (Coale and Hoover, 1958; Williamson and Higgins, 2001). On the contrary, under
a closed economy, lower mortality and lower fertility have the opposite eect on saving and investment
rates.
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7 Sensitivity analysis
In this section, I investigate how sensitive the model is to alternative specications. I also report the
results of three other simulations. In Figure 8, I introduce two simulations that maintain the baseline
assumptions, but use two opposing cases of how children are considered in the model: i) no family scale
(circled red line) and ii) altruism towards dependent children (squared green line). Like Curtis et al.
(2011), I nd that the `no kids' saving rate is higher than the baseline during the period analyzed.
Indeed, saving rates are on average overstated by 19% with respect to the baseline model. Nevertheless,
in this case, it is important to note that the timing of changes in saving rates are not modied, and that
this assumption does not inuence steady state values. In the second simulation, I consider the same




t;x) = (1 + c
t;x)u(c
j
t;x) with u0 > 0 and u00 < 0; (32)
which implies that household utility is proportional to the number of equivalent adult consumers in
the household. This modication implies that household heads are altruistic towards their dependent
children, raising total resources spent on children at the expense of saving. Thus, Figure 8 shows that
saving rates only decrease by 4%.























Figure 8: Family scale and altruism, Taiwan 1900-2050
27The third simulation shows the eect of a lower relative risk aversion coecient on saving rates
( = 2), see Figure 9. Besides the dierence in saving rates, a lower risk aversion coecient implies,
under a closed economy, a higher capital-to-output ratio, and hence lower interest rates. The dierence
in interest rates between open and closed economies would have been positive, implying that Taiwanese
households were net exporters of capital. This contrasts radically with national accounts data.






















Figure 9: Variations on the relative risk aversion, Taiwan 1900-2050































Figure 10: Simulated demographic eects on aggregate savings based on fth methods, Taiwan 1900-2050
Sources: Based on Figure 7 in (Lee et al., 2000, p. 213).
Note: LMM: Lee et al. (2000); HW: Higgins and Williamson (1997); KS: Kelley and Schmidt (1996); DP:
Deaton and Paxson (2000); Data: Actual household saving rates.
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